In this paper, we study the discrete logarithm problem in the finite fields F q n where n|q −1. The field is called a Kummer field or a Kummer extension of F q . It plays an important role in improving the AKS primality proving algorithm. It is known that we can efficiently construct an element g with order greater than 2 n in the fields. Let S q (•) be the function from integers to the sum of digits in their q-ary expansions. We present an algorithm that given g e (0 ≤ e < q n ) finds e in random polynomial time, provided that S q (e) < n. We then show that the problem is solvable in random polynomial time for most of the exponent e with S q (e) < 1.32n. The main tool for the latter result is the Guruswami-Sudan list decoding algorithm. Built on these results, we prove that in the field F q q−1 , the bounded sum-of-digits discrete logarithm with respect to g can be computed in random time O(f (w) log 4 (q q−1 )), where f is a subexponential function and w is the bound on the q-ary sum-of-digits of the exponent. Hence the problem is fixed parameter tractable. These results are shown to be extendible to Artin-Schreier extension F p p where p is a prime. Since every finite field has an extension of reasonable degree which is a Kummer field, our result reveals an unexpected property of the discrete logarithm problem, namely, the bounded sum-of-digits discrete logarithm problem in any given finite field becomes polynomial time solvable in certain low degree extensions.
Introduction and Motivations
Most of practical public key cryptosystems base their security on the hardness of solving the integer factorization problem or the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields. Both of the problems admit subexponential algorithms, thus we have to use long parameters, which make the encryption/decryption costly if the parameters are randomly chosen. Parameters of low Hamming weight, or more generally, of small sum-of-digits, offer some remedy. Using them speeds up the system while seems to keep the security intact. In particular, in the cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields of small characteristic, using small sumof-digits exponents is very attractive, due to the existence of normal bases [1] . It is proposed and implemented for smart cards and mobile devices, where the computing power is severely limited. Although attacks exploring the specialty were proposed [12] , none of them have polynomial time complexity.
Let F q n be a finite field. For β ∈ F q n , if β, β q , β q 2 , · · · , β q n−1 form a linear basis of F q n over F q , we call them a normal basis. It is known that a normal basis exists for every pair of prime power q and a positive integer n [9, Page 29]. Every element α in F q n can be represented as α = a 0 β + a 1 β q + · · · + a n−1 β
where a i ∈ F q for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. The power of q is a linear operation, α q = a 0 β q + · · · + a n−2 β q n−1 + a n−1 β.
Hence to compute the q-th power, we only need to shift the digits, which can be done very fast, possibly on the hardware level. Now suppose we want to compute α e where the q-ary expansion of e is e = e 0 + e 1 q + e 2 q 2 + · · · + e n−1 q n−1 (0 ≤ e i < q for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1).
The sum-of-digits of e in the q-ary expansion is defined as S q (e) = n−1 i=0 e i . When q = 2, the sum-of-digits becomes the famous Hamming weight. To compute α e , we only need to do shiftings and at most S q (e) number of multiplications. Furthermore, the exponentiation algorithm can be parallelized, which is a property not enjoyed by the large characteristic fields. For details, see [13] .
Related work
The discrete logarithm problem in finite field F q n , is to compute an integer e such that g ′ = g e , given a generator g of a subgroup of F * q n and g ′ in the subgroup. The general purpose algorithms to solve the discrete logarithm problem are the number field sieve and the function field sieve (for a survey see [11] ). They have time complexity
for some constant c, when q is small, or n is small. Suppose we want to compute the discrete logarithm of g e with respect to base g in the finite field F q n . If we know that the Hamming weight of e is equal to w, there is an algorithm proposed by Coppersmith, which works well if w is very small. It is a clever adaption of the baby-step giantstep idea, and runs in random time O( √ w
). It is proved in [12] that the average-case complexity achieves only a constant factor speed-up over the worst case. It is not clear how his idea can be generalized when the exponent has small sum-of-digits in the base q > 2. However, we can consider the very special case where e i ∈ {0, 1} for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and 0≤i≤n−1 e i = ⌊ n 2 ⌋, recall that e i 's are the digits of e in the q-ary expansion. It can be verified that the Coppersmith algorithm can be applied in this case. The time complexity becomes O( √ n ⌊n/2⌋ ⌊n/4⌋
). If q < n O(1) , it is much worse than the time complexity of the function field sieve on a general exponent.
If the q-ary sum-of-digits of the exponent is bounded by w, is there an algorithm which runs in time f (w) log c (q n ) and solves the discrete logarithm problem in F q n , for a arbitrary function f and a constant c? A similar problem has been raised from the parametric point of view by Fellows and Koblitz [8] , where they consider the prime finite fields and the bounded Hamming weight exponents. Their problem is listed among the most important open problems in the theory of parameterized complexity [7] . From the above discussions, it is certainly more relevant to cryptography to treat the finite fields with small characteristic and exponents with bounded sum-of-digits.
Unlike the case of the integer factorization, where a lot of special purpose algorithms exist, the discrete logarithm problem is considered more intractable in general. As an example, one should not use a RSA modulo of about 1000 bits with one prime factor of 160 bits. It would be vulnerable to the elliptic curve factorization algorithm. However, in the Digital Signature Standard, adopted by the U.S. government, the finite field has cardinality about 2 1024 or larger, while the encryption/decryption is done in a subgroup of cardinality about 2 160 . As another example, one should search for a secret prime as random as possible in RSA, while in the case of the discrete logarithm problem, one may use a finite field of small characteristic, hence the group of very special order. It is believed that no trapdoor can be placed in the group order, as long as it has a large prime factor (see the panel report on this issue in the Proceeding of Eurocrypt 1992). In order to have an efficient algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm, we need that every prime factor of the group order is bounded by a polynomial function on the cardinality of the field. Given the current state of analytic number theory, it is very hard, if not impossible, to prove that there exists infinite many of finite fields of even (or constant) characteristic, where the discrete logarithm can be solved in polynomial time.
In summary, there are several common perceptions about the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields:
1. As long as the group order has a big prime factor, the discrete logarithm problem is hard.
We may use exponents with small sum-of-digits, since the discrete logarithm problem in that case seems to be fixed parameter intractable. We gain advantage in speed by using bounded sum-of-digits exponents, and at the same time keep the problem as infeasible as using the general exponents.
2. If computing discrete logarithm is difficult, it should be difficult for any generator of the group. The discrete logarithm problem with respect to one generator can be reduced to the discrete logarithm problem with respect to any generator. Even though in the small sum-of-digits case, a reduction is not available, it is not known that changing the generator of the group affects the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.
Our results
In this paper, we show that those perceptions are problematic, by studying the discrete logarithm problem in large multiplicative subgroups of the Kummer and Artin-Schreier extensions with a prescribed generator. We prove that the bounded sum-of-digits discrete logarithm are easy in those groups. More precisely we prove constructively:
There exists a random algorithm to find the integer e given g and g e in F q n in time polynomial in log(q n ) under the conditions:
2. 0 ≤ e < q n , and S q (e) ≤ n;
Moreover, there does not exist an integer e ′ = e satisfying that 0 ≤ e ′ < q n , S q (e ′ ) ≤ n and g e ′ = g e A few comments are in order:
• For a finite field F q n , if n|q − 1, then there exists g ∈ F q n satisfying the condition in the theorem; if there exists α such that F q (α) = F q n and α n ∈ F q , then n|q − 1.
• As a comparison, Coppersmith's algorithm runs in exponential time in the case where e i ∈ {0, 1} for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, S q (e) = n 2 and q < n O(1) , while our algorithm runs in polynomial time in that case. On the other hand, Coppersmith's algorithm works for every finite field, while our algorithm works in Kummer fields. Our result has an indirect affect on an arbitrary finite field though, since every finite field has extensions of degree close to a given number, which are Kummer fields. As an example, suppose we want to find an extension of F q with degree about log 2 q. We first pick a random n close to log q such that (n, q) = 1. Let l be the order of q in Z/nZ. The field F (q l ) n is a Kummer extension of F q l , and an extension of F q . According to Theorem 1, there is a polynomial time algorithm which computes the discrete logarithm to some element g in F q ln provided that the sum-of-digits of the exponent in the q l -ary expansion is less than n. Hence our result reveals an unexpected property of the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields: the difficulty of bounded sum-of-digits discrete logarithm problem drops dramatically if we move up to extensions.
• Numerical evidences suggest that the order of g is close to the group order q n − 1, if it does not equal to q n − 1. However, it seems hard to prove it. In fact, this is one of the main obstacles in improving the efficiency of AKS-style primality testing algorithm [2] . We make the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1 Suppose that a finite field F q n and an element g in the field satisfy the conditions in Theorem 1. In addition, n ≥ log q. The order of g is greater than q n/c for an absolute constant c.
• Even though we can not prove that the largest prime factor of the order of g is very big, it seems, as supported by numerical evidences, that the order of g, which is a factor of q n − 1 bigger than 2 n , is rarely smooth. For instance, in the F 2 889 = F 128 127 , any g generates the whole group F * 2 889 . The order 2 889 − 1 contains a prime factor of 749 bits. One should not attempt to apply the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm here.
A natural question arises: can the restriction on the sum-of-digits in Theorem 1 be relaxed? Clearly if we can solve the problem under condition S q (e) ≤ (q − 1)n in polynomial time, then the discrete logarithm problem in subgroup generated by g is broken. If g is a generator of F * q n , then the discrete logarithm problem in F q n and any of its subfields to any base are broken. We find a surprising relationship between the relaxed problem and the list decoding problem. We are able to prove: Theorem 2 Suppose e is chosen in random from the set {0 ≤ e < q n − 1|S q (e) < 1.32n}.
There exists an algorithm given g and g e in F q n , to find e in time polynomial in log(q n ), with probability greater than 1 − c −n for some constant c greater than 1, under the conditions:
We also prove a parameterized complexity result concerning the bounded sum-of-digits discrete logarithm.
Theorem 3
There exists an element g of order greater than 2 q in F *−1 , such that the discrete logarithm problem with respect to the generator g can be solved in time f (w) log 4 (q q−1 ), where f is a subexponential function and w is the bound of the sum-of-digits of the exponent in q-ary expansion.
This answers an important open question in parameterized complexity for special, yet nonnegligible many, cases.
Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we list some results of counting numbers with small sum-of-digits. In Section 3, we present the basic idea and the algorithm, and prove Theorem 1. In Section 4, we prove Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. In Section 5, we extend the results to ArtinSchreier extensions. We conclude our paper with discussions of open problems.
Numbers with Small Sum-of-digits
Suppose that the q-ary expansion of a positive integer e is e = e 0 + e 1 q + e 2 q 2 + · · · + e n−1 q n−1 , where 0 ≤ e i ≤ q − 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. How many nonnegative integers e less than q n satisfy S q (e) = w? The number equals to the number of nonnegative integral solutions of
under the conditions that 0 ≤ e i ≤ q − 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Denote the number by N (w, n, q). The generating function for N (w, n, q) is
If w ≤ q − 1, then the conditions e i ≤ q − 1 can be removed, we have that N (w, n, q) = w+n−1 n−1 . It is easy to see that if q = 2, we have that N (w, n, 2) = n w . In the later section, we will need to estimate N (w, n, q), where w is n times a small constant less than 2. Since
Hence N (w, n, q) =
if q ≤ w < 2q.
The Basic Ideas and the Algorithm
Our basic idea is adopted from the index calculus algorithm. Let F q n be a Kummer extension of F q , namely, n|q − 1. Assume that q = p d where p is the characteristic. The field F q n is usually given as F p [x]/(u(x)) where u(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree dn over F p . If g satisfies the condition in Theorem 1, then x n − α n must be an irreducible polynomial over F q . Denote α n by a. To implement our algorithm, it is necessary that we work in another model of F q n , namely,
can be efficiently computed. To computer ψ(v(y)), where v(y) is a polynomial of degree at most dn − 1 over F p , all we have to do is to factor u(y) over F q [x]/(x n − a), and to evaluate v(y) at one of the roots. The random algorithm runs in expected time O(dn(dn + log q n )(dn log q n ) 2 ), and the deterministic algorithm runs in time O(dn(dn + q)(dn log q n ) 2 ). From now on we assume the model
Consider the subgroup generated by g = α + b in (F q [x]/(x n − a)) * , recall that b ∈ F * q and α = x (mod x n − a). The generator g has order greater than 2 n [6] , and has a very nice property as follows. Denote a q−1 n by h, we have
and more generally (α + b)
In the other word, we obtain a set of relations: log α+b (h i α + b) = q i for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. This corresponds to the precomputation stage of the index calculus. The difference is that, in our case, the stage finishes in polynomial time, while generally it requires subexponential time. For a general exponent e,
If f (α) is an element in F q n , where f ∈ F q [x] is a polynomial of degree less than n, and f (α) = (α + b) e and S q (e) < n, then due to unique factorization in F q [x], f (x) can be completely split into the product of linear factors over F q . We can read the discrete logarithm from the factorizations, after the coefficients are normalized. The algorithm is described as follows.
/(x n − a) satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1.
Output: e.
Define an order in F q (for example, use the alphabetic order). Compute and sort the list
(1, h, h 2 , h 3 , · · · , h n−1 ).
Suppose that g e is represented by f
(α), where f ∈ F q [x] has degree less than n. Factoring f (x) over F q , let f (x) = c(x + d 1 ) e 1 · · · (x + d k ) e k where c, d 1 , · · · , d k are in F q .
(Normalization) Normalize the coefficients and reorder the factors of f (x) such that their constant coefficients are b and f
4. Output e 0 + e 1 q + · · · + e n−1 q n−1 ;
The step 1 takes time O(n log 2 q log n + n log n log q) = O(n log n log 2 q). The most timeconsuming part is to factor a polynomial over F q with degree at most n. The random algorithm runs in expected time O(n(n + log q)(n log q) 2 ) and the deterministic algorithm runs in time O(n(n + q)(n log q) 2 ) = O(n 3 q log 2 q). Normalization and reordering can be done in time O(n log n log q), since we have a sort list of (1, h, h 2 , h 3 , · · · , h n−1 ). The total time complexity is thus in random time O(n(n + log q)(n log q) 2 ) and in deterministic time O(n 3 q log 2 q). This concludes the proof of the main theorem.
The Parameterized Complexity and The Application of List Decoding
A natural question arises: can we relax the bound on the sum-of-digits and still get a polynomial time algorithm? Solving the problem under the condition S q (e) ≤ (q − 1)n basically renders the discrete logarithm problems in F q n and any of its subfields easy. In this section, we consider the case when S q (e) ≤ 1.32n. Suppose that g e = f (α) where f (x) ∈ F q [x] has degree less than n. Use the same notations as in the previous section, we have
Hence there exists a polynomial t(x) with degree less than 0.32n such that
If there are at least 0.5657n > √ 0.32n · n number of nonzero e i 's, then the curve y = t(x) will pass at least 0.5657n point in the set
To find all the polynomials of degree less than 0.32n, which pass at least 0.5657n points in a given set of n points, is an instance of the list decoding problem. It turns out that there are only a few of such polynomials, and they can be found efficiently.
Proposition 1 (Guruswami-Sudan [10] ) Given n distinct elements x 0 , x 1 , · · · , x n−1 ∈ F q , n values y 0 , y 1 , · · · , y n−1 ∈ F q and a natural number k, there are at most O( √ n 3 k) many univariate polynomials t(x) ∈ F q [x] of degree at most k such that y i = t(x i ) for at least √ nk many points. Moreover, these polynomials can be found in random polynomial time.
For each t(x), we use the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm to factor f (x) + (x n − a) * t(x). There must exist a t(x) such that the polynomial f (x) + (x n − a) * t(x) can be completely factored into a product of linear factors in {h q i x + b|0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1}, and e is computed as a consequence. In order to prove Theorem 2, it remains to show:
We have
for some constant c > 1 when n is sufficiently large.
Proof:
The cardinality of A n,q is
32n n > 4.883987... n . The cardinality of A n,q ∩ B n is less than Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3. Any f (x) where f (α) = (α + b) e ∈< α + b >⊆ F−1 is congruent to a product of at most w = S q (e) linear factors modulo x q−1 − a. If w < q − 1, we have an algorithm running in time O(q 4 log 2 q), according to Theorem 1. So we only need to consider the case when w ≥ q − 1. The general purpose algorithm will run in random time f (log−1 ), where f is a subexponential function. Since log−1 ≤ w log w, this proves Theorem 3.
Artin-Schreier Extensions
Let p be a prime. The Artin-Schreier extension of a finite field F p is F p p . It is easy to show that x p − x − a = 0 is an irreducible polynomial in F p for any a ∈ F * p . So we may take
and similarly (α + b)
Hence the results for Kummer extensions can be adopted to Artin-Schreier extensions. For the subgroup generated by α + b, we have a polynomial algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm if the exponent has p-ary sum-of-digits less than p. Note that b may be 0 in this case.
Theorem 4
There exists an algorithm to find the integer e given g and g e in F p p in time polynomial in log p p under the conditions:
1. 0 ≤ e < p p , and S q (e) ≤ p − 1;
p . Moreover, there does not exist an integer e ′ = e satisfying that 0 ≤ e ′ < p p , S q (e ′ ) ≤ n and g e ′ = g e .
Theorem 5
There exists an element g of order greater than 2 p in F * p p , such that the discrete logarithm problem with respect to g can be solved in time O(f (w)(log p p ) 4 ), where f is a subexponential function and w is the bound of the sum-of-digits of the exponent in the p-ary expansion.
Theorem 6
Suppose that g = α + b, where F p (α) = F p p , b ∈ F p and α p + α ∈ F * p . Suppose e is chosen in random from the set {0 ≤ e < q n − 1|S q (e) < 1.32n}.
There exists an algorithm given g and g e in F p p , to find e in time polynomial in log(p p ), with probability greater than 1 − c −n for some constant c greater than 1.
Conclusion Remarks
A novel idea in the celebrated AKS primality testing algorithm, is to construct a subgroup of large cardinality through linear elements in finite fields. The subsequent improvements [4, 5, 3] rely on constructing a single element of large order. It is speculated that these ideas will be useful in attacking the integer factorization problem. In this paper, we show that they do affect the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields. We give an efficient algorithm which computes the bounded sum-of-digits discrete logarithm with respect to prescribed bases in Kummer fields. We emphasize that this is more than a result which deals with only special cases, as every finite field has extensions of reasonable degrees which are Kummer fields. One of the most interesting problems is to further relax the restriction on the sum-of-digits of the exponent. Another important open problem is to prove Conjecture 1. If that conjecture is true, the AKS-style primality proving can be made compatible or better than ECPP or the cyclotomic testing in practice.
